( shrink)Īristotle determines eristic argument as argument which either operates upon the basis of acceptable premisses (endoxa) and merely give the impression of being deductive, or argument which truly is deductive but operates upon the basis of premisses which seem to be acceptable, but are not (or, again, argument which uses both of these mechanisms). Accordingly, this treatise offers an wide set of logical and linguistic tools that can be applied to any discursive universe, favouring a deep scrutiny of proposition to be examined. My main argument is that what is in fact useful to get to know the first principles is not dialectic itself, but the treatise at stake, the Topics. - English: My aim is to develop an interpretation about how Aristotelian dialectic can be useful to philosophy and, in more specific terms, to knowledge of the first principles, avoiding epistemological problems regarding the away one can explain the knowledge of propositions which are primaries and trues, by departing from proposition whose truth-evaluation is not assured, the endoxa. ![]() ) filosófico, mas o próprio tratado, os Tópicos, na medida em que esse tratado oferece um conjunto amplo de ferramentas argumentativas que permitem ao seu estudante um domínio de técnicas lógico-linguísticas que podem ser aplicadas em qualquer âmbito discursivo, favorecendo o escrutínio mais profundo de proposições a serem examinadas. Meu argumento central é que não é a dialética que, afinal, é útil para o conhecimento (. Meu objetivo nesse texto é oferecer uma interpretação do modo como a dialética aristotélica pode ser útil para a filosofia em geral, e o conhecimento dos princípios em particular, sem incorrer em problemas epistemológicos geralmente presentes ao se tentar explicar como, a partir de proposições das quais não temos comprovação do valor de verdade que possuem, as endoxa, se pode conhecer proposições primeiras e verdadeiras. Finally, although Aristotle saw philosophy as a solitary activity, he th. I find that the Topics provides inadequate grounds for thinking that Aristotle saw Topics VIII as describing standards or techniques of argument that were appropriate for philosophy, and so these texts cannot be used by contemporary commentators to shed light on Aristotle's philosophical practice. ) solitary nature of philosophical inquiry, which puts into question the philosophical relevance of Topics VIII. The text that grounds this claim, however, raises a further problem: it highlights the (. It will turn out that, although there are important exceptions, the techniques for finding arguments described in Topics I–VII are, by and large, locations that Aristotle thought of as appropriate for use in philosophical inquiry. I claim that, in the Topics, Aristotle advises dialectical questioners to intentionally argue fallaciously in order to escape from some dialectically awkward positions, and I work through the consequences of that claim. This match between the object and the subject is the most decisive factor for the certainty of sciences. Secondly, there is not always a perfect match between the studied matter and the human faculty to ascertain. First, all things do not possess the same stability and constancy. Although Aquinas agrees with Aristotle in affirming that not every science enjoys the same certainty, this fact is due to different reasons. Therefore, it does not simply constitute a rational game about quiddities, but it studies things in their real actuality and must (. Metaphysics, unlike dialectics, is not only based on the being of reason but also on the natural being. This problem is investigated in Aquinas, who decidedly denies that metaphysics uses dialectics because it just provides probability. In these pages the author intends to examine the idea, quite widespread among Aristotle’s recent scholars, that the method of metaphysics were mainly dialectical. To better appreciate how the proposed location of dialectic in a pre-demonstrative stage of inquiry is operational, the paper finally examines Physics IV.1-5. ![]() This contribution consists in providing the preliminary accounts of facts in order to have scientific inquiry started, as required in Posterior Analytics II.8. ![]() ![]() ) beyond its well-attested methodological role in discarding contradictory opinions and its (possible though not germane to the context of Topics I.2) application to proving the principle of non-contradiction by means of refutation. However, it also defends a substantive (but still modest) contribution of dialectic ‒ (. It argues that such a use cannot imply ‒ at any stage of inquiry ‒ a replacement of the logic and intrinsic goals of demonstration by those proper to dialectic. By framing Aristotle’s dialectic in the broader context of scientific inquiry and demonstration, this paper is aimed at showing of what use the “reputable opinions” can be for grasping the principles of sciences, as declared in Topics I.2.
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